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ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on the connection between agreed solutions 
to the insolvency of listed companies implying changes in corporate control 
and the rules governing takeover bids. The solution to insolvency problems 
sometimes leads to a change in corporate control, namely when the solution 
involves modifying the capital structure of the company. In such cases, when 
the insolvent entity is a listed company, takeover bid regulation must be 
taken into account, as it can render the operation impossible or economically 
useless, if the change in control of the company must be accompanied by a 
mandatory takeover bid. As seen below, there are specific rules governing 
these scenarios. This paper reviews how Spanish Law deals with the situation, 
although certain general ideas will be initially provided as an introduction to 
the problem. 
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1 This paper is the result of my participation in the VIII Harvard-Complutense 
Seminar (“Mergers and acquisitions in the context of the financial crisis”), that took place 
between 27 and 30 september 2010 at the Harvard Law School in the context of the 
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I. REFINANCING, INSOLVENCY AND CORPORATE 
CONTROL. 
 
 There are two questions that must be answered before dealing with 
the issue addressed by this paper. I will attempt to do so in this section. The 
first step is to determine whether it is possible and probable for legal or 
agreed solutions to solvency problems to lead to a change in corporate 
control. Secondly, I will attempt to answer the question of whether the rules 
governing the corporate control of listed companies and takeover bids 
should remain the same, even if the change of control takes place as an 
effect of the solution to the financial or solvency problems of the company 
involved. 
 
A. SOLUTIONS FOR COMPANIES IN DISTRESS AS A 
SOURCE OF CHANGES IN CORPORATE CONTROL 
 
 Can a change in corporate control take place in the context of a 
financial crisis, as an effect of the situation or its possible solutions? The 
answer is undoubtedly positive. In fact, it can come as a result of specific 
rules governing certain kinds of debtors or from voluntary agreements. 
 
 There are markets with special procedures for the solvency problems 
of their participants, which can lead to a change in control of the companies 
affected. The clearest example is the specific rules governing financial 
markets. In the case of banks, before the crisis leads to a situation in which 
the only solution is insolvency law, which would be highly problematic, not 
only for debtors or creditors, but also for the financial sector itself, it is 
reasonable to establish specific procedures to avoid the situation, whenever 
possible. Under such procedures, rules giving certain Public Authorities the 
power to change who is managing the companies are common. In Spain, the 
laws governing banks in crisis even grant the Bank of Spain the power to 
change a Board of Directors (see arts. 31 and 36 of Ley 26/1988, de 29 de 
julio, sobre Disciplina e Intervención de las Entidades de Crédito -Act 
26/1988, dated 29 July on Discipline and Intervention in Credit Entities-, 
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which provides for the replacing of directors for persons appointed by the 
Bank of Spain in cases in which the situation is so serious that it endangers 
the liquidity or even the solvency of the bank, amongst others). Similar 
provisions can be found in other markets, i.e. insurance or investment 
companies. 
 
 Special provisions are not the only scenarios that can lead to a change 
in corporate control in the context of a financial crisis. Particular agreements 
to end solvency problems are a common source of such changes. It is clear 
that certain agreed solutions for distressed debtors can imply changes in 
whom is controlling the company, namely when the agreement includes 
changes to the legal capital structure. The clearest example of this situation 
is when a financial crisis is solved by the entry of new investors as 
shareholders or by the increase of the capital held by shareholders making a 
capital contribution. At times, the lack of assets to cover company debts is 
solved by a new supply of equity, which leads to an increase in the legal 
capital of the company as a result of the new shares that must be issued in 
exchange. In such cases, the legal capital structure may change as a result of 
the entry of new investors or an increase in the holdings of existing 
shareholders. It is obvious that the change can have an impact on the control 
of the company. Such would be the case when the new shareholders’ capital 
represents more than 50% of the total, or when previous shareholders with a 
lower share end up owning 50% after the transaction. This effect can take 
place not only after a new contribution of equity, but also when creditors 
agree to change their position in a debt-for-equity swap agreement. 
Additionally, the effects can result from stand alone agreements or from a 
wider restructuring agreement including such operations (i.e., sale or 
liquidation of part of the company’s businesses, plus a new supply of equity 
or debt for equity swap agreements). 
 
 These operations that typically lead to a change in corporate control 
are thus clearly possible in strictly theoretical terms. It should here be 
considered whether or not the agreements are possible under Spanish law as 
a solution to a company’s solvency problems, either as a pre-insolvency 
workout or as a voluntary agreement under insolvency proceedings. 
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  The preference for out of court solutions, via an agreement between 
the distressed debtor and some of its creditors in an attempt to solve its 
liquidity or solvency problems is well known: they are shorter, less expensive 
and avoid potentially harmful publicity2. These reasons remain the same if 
the agreement indirectly leads to a change in corporate control, because of 
the solutions provided to the debtor. In general terms, there can be no 
objections to such an agreement. The out of court alternative offered by the 
creditors or the debtor may include provisions resulting in a change in the 
control of the company, such as those mentioned above. Furthermore, they 
normally form part of such agreements. However, the existence of general 
rules governing the agreements (pre-insolvency refinancing or restructuring 
agreements) can seriously affect their use and how the parties design them. 
 
 The Spanish Insolvency Act (Ley 22/2003, de 9 de Julio, Concursal, 
hereinafter, “LC”) provides for such agreements, setting out the conditions 
under which they are protected against rescission resulting from fraudulent 
transfer (Additional Provision 4, LC, hereinafter “DA 4”)3. Even with a limited 
scope of application, the rules play a relevant role, as they act as an incentive 
or disincentive for the parties to decide whether to reach an agreement 
before bankruptcy or under insolvency proceedings. It therefore has to be 
determined whether agreements with this purpose or effect (change in 
company control by means of a capital increase to allow an input of equity, 
for instance) will be covered by the special protection. If the answer is 
affirmative, the conditions required to benefit from said protection will be 
relevant and the parties will probably tend to design agreements and the 
negotiation process in order to comply with them. 
 
                                             
2 See, amongst others in the Spanish legal doctrine, PULGAR, 2008, 1ff. 
3 One of the main features of DA4 LC is its limited scope of application, as it 
focuses only on the protection of this type of agreement against rescission, leaving out 
many of the other problems arising (automatic stay effects, how creditors who are not 
part of the agreement might be affected by its provisions, etc.), see GARCIA CRUCES, 19; 
GUTIERREZ GILSANZ, 2010, 656. The expected reform of the law, even retaining the DA4, 
is expected to deal with these problems from a broader perspective, as in other countries 
such as France or Italy. 
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 The rule regarding refinancing agreements prior to bankruptcy, when 
certain conditions are met, protects this kind of agreement from the risk of 
rescission resulting from fraudulent transfer under arts. 71 ff. LC. One of the 
conditions is that the agreement result in a significant increase in the credit 
available to the company (“ampliación significativa del crédito disponible”) or 
the modification of obligations by way of substitution or the extension of 
deadlines (“modificación de sus obligaciones, bien mediante la prórroga de su 
plazo de vencimiento, bien mediante el establecimiento de otras contraídas 
en sustitución de aquéllas”). The question, then, is whether these concepts 
embrace agreements such as debt for equity swaps or capital increases with 
supply of new equity. Although disputed4 and depending ultimately on the 
particular provisions of each particular agreement, I believe that at least 
some agreements of this kind should fall under the scope of DA 4 of the LC. 
If creditors agree to exchange their credit for shares, for instance, the debt is 
transformed into equity and thus leads to an improvement in the debtor’s 
financial situation. Even if the provision is strictly construed (there would be 
no increase in credit, as equity is also a debt to shareholders), in my opinion 
there is little doubt that the agreement will fit into the scope of DA 4 of the 
LC. It should be seen as a substitution of the previous obligations, with the 
effect of improving the company’s financial situation. These agreements 
must comply with certain conditions to benefit from the special protection 
against rescission in the event of subsequent insolvency of the company. 
They are mainly formal: (a) a viability plan is required; (b) at least three fifths 
of the debt must agree to the agreement, (c) a report must be submitted by 
an independent expert appointed by the Registry and (d) the agreement must 
be executed as a public deed. A full analysis of these conditions will not be 
made, as it is not the main subject of this paper. It should be noted, 
however, that the protection will act as an incentive for the parties to meet 
their conditions. As mentioned above, we must expect DA 4 LC to influence 
the way the parties involved design the agreement and the negotiation 
process. 
 
                                             
4 See GARCIA CRUCES, 24, claiming that structural modifications like debt for 
equity and consequent increases in legal capital are not covered by DA4 LC. 
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 Similar considerations may apply to agreements reached during 
procedure as a solution. It must be determined whether insolvency law allows 
the clauses as valid content of the agreement (i.e. entry of new shareholders 
by means of an equity contribution, debt for equity agreements, mergers, 
etc.) and, in such case, under what conditions. The question arises in Spanish 
Law, as there are several rules setting limits on what can be agreed in a 
voluntary agreement during insolvency. This is the purpose of art. 100 LC, 
which serves as an instrument to prevent certain well-known abuse of the 
repealed law. The rule, in any event, allows voluntary agreements partially 
containing pacts of structural modification – mergers or debt for equity and 
consequent capital increase. Therefore, there is no doubt as to the 
availability of these instruments during insolvency proceedings, although it 
should be noted that a number of problems arise in such operations, due to 
the lack of coordination between Insolvency and Company Law5. 
Furthermore, the basic rule governing the content of voluntary agreements in 
insolvency proceedings is the freedom of contract, thus any content that is 
not strictly forbidden must be considered as allowed. Accordingly, not only 
mergers or debt for equity operations, which are strictly mentioned as 
allowed, but also any other pact that could lead to a change of control could 
validly form part of the agreement. In this regard, even the possible 
existence of steering committees might question the control of the company, 
depending on the powers given to the committee. 
 
B. TAKEOVER BIDS AND CHANGE IN CONTROL IN THE 
CONTEXT OF INSOLVENCY 
 
 To fully understand why this is an issue, it is necessary to recall 
certain basic features of takeover bids and, in particular, those that are 
mandatory. It is well known that the gaining of control requires a premium to 
                                             
5 See, in general, debt for equity as content of voluntary agreements in insolvency 
proceedings, GUTIERREZ GILSANZ, A. (2009). 
There are several studies on the connection between Insolvency and Company Law 
in the context of structural modifications as a solution, in part, to the solvency problems 
of a company. All of them highlight the problems resulting from a lack of coordination. 
See for all PULGAR, 2009, 735. 
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be paid to the seller, as market prices do not reflect the value of control 
itself. Without bearing in mind other purposes, mandatory takeover bids 
constitute the instrument created to guarantee that all the shareholders of a 
listed company have the right to a share in the control premium, i.e., the 
premium paid for the shares carrying the power to control the targeted 
company. It refers ultimately to the equitable treatment of shareholders as 
such and as investors in a listed company6. These considerations play an 
important role in understanding why the rules requiring mandatory takeover 
bids may need to be adapted to situations in which control is gained because 
of a legal or agreed solution to the solvency problems of a listed company. 
The main reason why these situations are considered as exceptional and 
which explain the differences in the legal regime governing takeover bids is 
how the control premium works in such cases. In distressed companies, 
there may be no control premium or, in many cases, it will be negative, as 
the new controllers will have to bear the restructuring costs and eliminate 
losses for the company to survive. As an additional reason, sometimes there 
could be an interest worthier of protection than that of individual investors, 
namely the general interest in the company surviving (jobs, market stability, 
etc.). As a mandatory takeover bid will probably increase the cost of the 
operation, it could compromise the solution to the company’s solvency 
problems. This being so, the interest in promoting a solution helps to 
explain why takeover bids rules must be adapted  7. 
 
 One possible way of adapting the rules involves the concept of 
equitable price. It is well known that the EU Directive on takeover bids (Dir 
2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 april 2004 
on takeover bids) requires Member State national legislation to ensure a bid 
is made at an equitable price in mandatory takeover bids (art. 5). Equitable 
price is a protection for shareholders that is necessary in a system in which 
                                             
6 For a recent broader explanation of these principles in the context of takeover 
bid regulation, see RECALDE, 2010, 27 ff. and SANCHEZ CALERO, 2009, 33. Also see a 
more skeptical view in PAZ-ARES, 2002a y 2002b.  
7 See SANCHEZ CALERO, 2009, 196: the reason is that under these circumstances, 
the mandatory takeover rule will be less favorable for minority shareholders. Similar 
considerations in TAPIA HERMIDA/ALONSO LEDESMA/RODRÍGUEZ MARTÍNEZ, 2009, 256.  
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mandatory bids can me made after gaining control and, under the EU 
Directive, should be the highest stock price in a defined period of time 
before the bid, which can range from 6 to 12 months, depending on the 
Member State concerned (see art. 5.4, which closely follows the terms of rule 
9.5 of the British Takeover Code regarding the consideration that should be 
offered). If probable that the control premium is negative or when there are 
interests worthier of protection than those relating to the shareholders, a 
way of promoting a solution, even if it leads to a change in control of the 
company, is to decrease the cost of the operation if a takeover bid is still 
mandatory. One way to do so is to adapt the rule on equitable price. A 
takeover bid must be made anyway, but the cost will be lower. This is the 
reason why the Directive allows national legislation to adapt the equitable 
price rule “in order to enable a firm in difficulty to be rescued”. Ultimately, it 
depends on the Member State to allow the supervisor to reduce the price in 
this regard, but it is a expressly accepted possibility in some countries, 
including Spain (see art. 9.4, f) of Real Decreto 1066/2007, de 27 julio, -
Royal Decree 1066/2007, dated 27 July, hereinafter RDOPAS-) 8. 
 
 A second alternative is to dispense with the mandatory nature of the 
takeover bid in situations relating to the company’s financial problems. This 
exemption is not included in the EU Directive, but is a possibility offered to 
legislators. In fact, exceptions to the mandatory takeover bid are common 
and it would therefore only require the including of a provision regarding 
solvency or financial problems as grounds for the exception. Spanish law on 
takeover bids is a good example. The RDOPAS includes an article on 
exceptions to the rules on takeover bids in different circumstances. There are 
two different categories of exceptions, the so-called “dispensas” 
(dispensation) and “excepciones” (exemptions). The difference is that 
exemptions do not require the supervisor (CNMV) to act in any way, as their 
conditions are expressly defined in the RDOPAS (see art. 8 RDOPAS). 
Dispensation, however, occurs on a case-by-case basis and requires an act to 
be performed by the CNMV. It could therefore be said that dispensation is an 
                                             
8 On equitable price and its adaptation see, amongst others, FERNANDEZ DEL 
POZO, 2010a and 2010b. 
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instrument that grants exemption from an actual obligation, whereas in an 
exemption, there is no obligation to make a takeover bid when the 
requirements are met9. According to this alternative, Spanish law contains 
several exemptions covering the financial or solvency problems of a company 
as grounds for excluding mandatory takeover bids. It could be debatable 
whether they are exemptions by nature or rather dispensations, however the 
RDOPAS excludes a mandatory takeover bid when control is gained as a 
result of the law regarding financial institution receivership (see art. 8 a) 
RDOPAS, in connection with Ley 26/1988, de 29 de julio, sobre Disciplina e 
Intervención de las Entidades de Crédito, previously mentioned as an 
example of these procedures) or in debt for equity agreements entered into 
by companies in distress (art. 8 d) RDOPAS). 
 
II. DEBT FOR EQUITY AGREEMENTS, GAINING OF 
CONTROL AND TAKEOVER BID EXEMPTION UNDER 
SPANISH LAW. 
 
 This second part of this paper focuses on the exemption of mandatory 
takeover bids set forth in art. 8d) RDOPAS after control is gained in the listed 
company by way of a debt for equity agreement serving as an instrument to 
ensure the survival of a company in distress. It therefore does not cover 
either the exemption regarding financial institution receivership (and similar 
institutions) or other kind of agreements that may result in a change in 
control. In the first case, because the main point of interest in such cases is 
to study the specific receivership regulation, which has been done in other 
studies already published or underway10. In the second case, because there is 
no specific exemption for such agreements and a takeover bid would be 
mandatory even if they served as an instrument for solving the company’s 
                                             
9 See SENENT, 2010 and SANCHEZ CALERO 2009, 190. 
10 Other speakers in the VIII Harvard-Complutense Seminar studied these special 
institutions, deeply modified in the latest times, either under the Spanish law or from a 
wider perspective. Some of their work is already available as working papers where the 
reader could find a deeper analysis of the main points of these instruments facing the 
problem of financial institution distress (see MARTINEZ ROSADO, 2010). Some published 
works also give a good insight on these institutions and connect them with the issue of 
this paper, see lately LEON SANZ, 2010, 184 ff. 
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financial problems. In these cases, it should be noted again that the 
mandatory takeover bid legal provision will act as a disincentive, as it will 
increase the cost of the operation and may render it impossible, even if there 
is an adjustment of the equitable price that must be offered to the 
shareholders. In addition to cost, the uncertainty resulting from the fact that 
the adjustment is subsequent to the operation itself plays an important role, 
ultimately depending on the decision of the supervisor, which will logically 
follow the agreement. As the whole refinancing/ restructuring operation will 
depend upon the adjustment, not being sure a priori that it will be 
authorized, it serves as a substantial disincentive for the parties to decide to 
use this kind of agreement. 
 
 Spanish law dispenses with the obligation to make a mandatory 
takeover bid in operations where control is gained as a result of a debt for 
equity agreement reached to ensure the long term recovery of companies 
whose financial survival is under a serious and imminent threat. This kind of 
provision is not new to Spanish law. A similar exemption was already present 
in the 1991 RD, after its amendment by RD 432/2003, dated 11 April. 
Although there are relevant differences, which will be considered below, art. 
4 of RD 1197/1991 (now repealed) also dispensed with the obligation to 
make a mandatory takeover bid whenever resulting from a voluntary 
agreement of debt exchanged for stock during insolvency proceedings. One 
of the main features of the current Spanish system is that the exemption is 
not automatic, as it requires a series of poorly defined conditions, evaluated 
by the supervisor. Consequently, exemption is subject to the due 
authorization of the CNMV. I will now explain the main features of the rule, 
starting with the operation referred to, followed by how it must be linked to 
the solution for a company in distress and ending with the non automatic 
nature of the exemption. 
 
A. CONTROL MUST FOLLOW A DEBT FOR EQUITY 
AGREEMENT 
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 I have already pointed out that control can be gained by many ways in 
agreements regarding the solution of company financial problems. However, 
the RDOPAS limits the scope of application of the exemption rule to only one 
of such agreements: when control is gained as a result of a debt for stock 
agreement. It must be clear when control is supposed to be gained and what 
operations fall under the category of debt for equity, for the purposes of art. 
8d) RDOPAS. 
 
 The exemption does not define when control is gained and thus 
makes a takeover bid mandatory. Being an exception to the basic rule of 
mandatory takeover bids, the definition must be sought where the basic rule 
is given: art. 3 RDOPAS. This article uses two indicators of the existence of 
control: the holding of a voting rights share equal to or exceeding 30% or, if 
less, the appointing of a number of directors that, together with the directors 
previously appointed within the 24 months subsequent to acquiring the 
share represents more than half the company’s board of directors. This 
control can be gained by just one person holding the voting rights share or 
by several persons acting in concert. In addition to these indicators, it must 
be specifically considered that the takeover bid is mandatory if and only if 
control has been acquired by any of three ways11: (a) the acquisition of 
securities granting voting rights in the company or the acquisition of voting 
rights resulting from usufruct, pledge or a contractual relationship; (b) 
agreements reached with other shareholders; and (c) the gaining of control 
of another company, even if unlisted, that leads to a share with voting rights 
in a listed company equal to the percentage set forth in art. 3 RDOPAS (see 
art. 7 RDOPAS) 12. 
                                             
11 See FARRANDO, 2010, 60 
12 Mandatory takeover bid follows any change in control, being irrelevant if it is 
direct or indirect (i.e., as a consequence of gaining the control of a controlling company). 
This difference, however, plays an important role for the exemption, as legal doctrine 
suggests that, out of the case of financial institutions in which the exemption applies not 
only for the company controlled but to any indirect change of control in companies 
controlled by the financial institution (see art. 8a) RDOPAS), the exemption granted by art. 
8d RDOPAS will not cover indirect control gained on other listed companies after the 
change of control of any distressed listed company as a result of a debt for equity swap 
agreement. The difference is explained as a consequence of the stronger public interest 
present in the solution for solvency problems of financial institutions (see LEON, 2010, 
211). 
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  Exempt operations are those in which control comes as a result of the 
acquisition of securities or any other operation resulting from a debt for 
equity agreement, the latter taken in a broad sense, as explained below. The 
law therefore limits the exemption from having to make a takeover bid to the 
gaining of control from a specific operation. The way in which control is 
gained is irrelevant, provided it comes as a result of a debt for equity 
agreement. How to understand this concept and whether control must only 
result from the agreement is crucial to fully appreciating the extent of the 
exemption. 
 
 Debt for equity swaps are a very common tool in debt restructuring, 
both in pre-bankruptcy solutions as well as in insolvency proceedings. In 
strictly financial terms, they imply a debt being exchanged for a certain 
amount of equity. The issue of new shares is not required, as it can be made 
using the alternative of increasing nominal value, but in any case, an increase 
in the legal capital must accompany the operation. Under the Spanish law, 
such operations must be pursuant to the general rules governing capital 
increases (arts. 295 ff. of RD Legislativo 1/2010, de 2 de Julio, por el que se 
aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Sociedades de Capital -Royal 
Legislative Decree 1/2010, dated 2 July, Limited Liabilities Company Act-, 
[hereinafter, “LSC”]) and those regarding shares for debt exchange (art. 301 
LSC). It is important to clarify that they can result from a specific debt for 
equity exchange agreement or simply be the effect of how the debt itself was 
created. There are cases in which the debt exchanged for stock were bonds 
that, at the time that they were issued, were thought to be exchangeable for 
shares upon the request of the owner at a particular time (typically, when the 
bond had to be repaid). The difference can play an important role under 
Spanish law. As we have already observed, the rules governing pre-
bankruptcy workouts protection against rescission require the agreement to 
modify “obligations by replacing them for new obligations or extending the 
deadline”. It might be thought that in such cases, the condition is not met as 
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the obligation seems to have remained intact under the same terms (bond for 
share exchange must meet the conditions upon issue, art. 302 LSC)13. 
 
 The wording of art. 8 d) RDOPAS does not support a strict 
interpretation of the operations covered by the exemption. Its provisions do 
not strictly refer to the typical corporate law capital increase by way of a debt 
for shares exchange and covers all operations in which a debt is transformed 
into shares, resulting in the gaining of control. The exemption will thus apply 
when the control is acquired, for instance, after foreclosure of share pledges 
or in cases of share assignment14. In addition, control must not result only 
from a debt for equity exchange. If it is the result of a combination of 
different factors, one of them being the debt for equity agreement, 
exemption will also apply. It is doubtful, however, whether the gaining of 
control resulting from a complex operation will benefit from the exemption, 
without considering the importance of the debt for equity agreement in order 
to gain such control. Although I do not believe it necessary for control to be 
gained only as a result of a debt for equity operation, its role must be more 
than insignificant to preserve the exceptional nature of the exemption. If not, 
a simple one share exchange for an insignificant debt would suffice to 
benefit from the exemption. 
 
 It must be highlighted that the debt exchanged for equity could have 
been previously transferred, allowing the exemption to be applied in 
complex operations where, for instance, a debt is transferred to a special 
purpose company or to one of the previous shareholders15. This was 
impossible under the 2003 Spanish takeover bids regulation, as it required 
creditors converted into the controlling shareholder to have been the original 
creditor, the exemption therefore not being possible if the debt was 
previously transferred to a third party16. This broadening of the scope of 
                                             
13 See TAPIA, 2010, 112 
14 LEON SANZ, 2010, 209. 
15 LEON SANZ, 2010, 209 
16 Repealed art. 4 RD1197/1991 read “provided the creditor was the original one 
and not because of an assignment of credit”. 
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application of the exemption to mandatory takeover bids seems somehow 
incoherent with how insolvency law deals with debt transfers after insolvency 
(for instance, the LC does not grant assignees the right to vote at a creditors’ 
meeting to decide upon a voluntary agreement in insolvency proceedings, in 
an obvious attempt to prevent a voting rights market, for fear of fraudulent 
transactions, see art. 122 LC17). 
 
B. SOLUTION FOR COMPANIES IN DISTRESS 
 
 A second condition to be met for the exemption to apply is that the 
debt for equity leading to the gaining of control be a solution for a company 
in distress. Art. 8 d) RDOPAS was deliberately conceived with a very broad 
scope of application in this regard. According to the wording, the exemption 
applies to any listed company whose “financial viability is in serious and 
imminent danger, even if not subject to insolvency proceedings”, provided 
the operation is “designed to ensure financial recovery in the long term”. The 
law clearly requires two different conditions that must be considered 
separately. 
 
 Firstly, the listed company must be under a serious and imminent 
danger, but not necessarily under insolvency proceedings. The legislator 
could have linked the situation to a specific legal concept, such as that of 
insolvency, or to a specific legal situation, such as insolvency proceedings. In 
fact, that was the choice of the repealed 1991 Royal Decree, after the 
amendment of 2003. The exemption applied only to agreements reached in 
insolvency proceedings, thus requiring the company to be subject to such 
proceedings. However, the RDOPAS 2007 uses a different approach, probably 
because a stringent scope of application could render the exemption useless 
in many cases. Many problems arise from a wider definition, but it 
                                             
17 The proposed reform of the Spanish Insolvency Law, now being discussed in the 
Congress (the latest version when this paper was finished could be find here: 
http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CONG/BOCG/A/A_119-01.PDF), will allow 
credits’ assignees to vote at the creditors’ meeting if the law is finally passed without 
change in this regard. The new art. 122 LC will limit, however, this right to any assignee 
being an “institution under financial supervision”, what seems to be read as a bank or 
equivalent. Any other assignee will still not be able to vote if the wording remain the same 
and the law is finally passed. 
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guarantees that the exemption will apply also in situations equivalent to a 
voluntary agreement under insolvency proceedings. Considering the reasons 
for exemption of a mandatory takeover bid and the purpose of the rule18, the 
scope of application is linked to companies in distress. If exemption is to be 
granted because the control premium is negative or there are interests 
worthy of protection other than shareholder interests, the exemption must 
be given any time the situation arises. And it is clearly logical to identify the 
situation when the future existence of the company is threatened by a 
serious and imminent danger. 
 
 The exemption is intentionally disassociated to insolvency 
proceedings and the conditions required for such proceedings to commence. 
This does not mean that voluntary agreements in insolvency proceedings are 
not covered. If the content of the agreement includes a debt for equity swap 
leading to a gaining of control, the exemption will apply, provided every 
other condition is met, as stated above. What I mean by a disconnection 
between the RDOPAS and the LC is that the basic requirement for exemption 
must not be identified with the requirement for insolvency proceedings to 
commence, i.e., insolvency. Under Spanish law, the latter is defined as the 
impossibility for a debtor to "meet its obligations in a regular and timely 
manner”, whether at the time or in the near future. Even if the wording used 
in art. 2 LC seems to be close to that of art. 8d) RDOPAS, it would be a 
mistake to construe the rule under the filter of insolvency law. RDOPAS also 
uses the word imminent, but it should not be read as equivalent to 
“imminent insolvency” that Spanish insolvency law borrowed from German 
Law. If a company foresees that it will be unable to meet its obligations in a 
regular and timely manner in the near future, its financial viability is clearly in 
danger. But it does not mean that the future existence of the company is 
subject to a serious and imminent danger only where it is or foresees to be in 
the future, unable to meet its obligations in the sense of art. 2 LC. 
 
 For the reasons indicated above, it is not possible to use the concept 
of current or imminent insolvency as the only reference to define the scope 
                                             
18 See LEON, 2010,  208 
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of application of the exemption referred to in art. 8 d) RDOPAS. If the law has 
consciously departed from the notion of insolvency, it would be a mistake to 
resort to legal doctrine and court interpretation of the notions used by the 
LC. As an undefined concept, it should be construed by reference to the 
purpose of the rule, bearing in mind why the exemption is granted and the 
clear intention of giving it a broad scope of application to cover not only 
legally defined situations, but rather all financial situations seriously 
endangering the future of the company19. As stated above, as an 
extraordinary repeal of the mandatory takeover rule, the exemption must 
also require the operation leading to a gaining of control to be the only 
solution or, at least, the one with lowest costs, given that the interests of 
shareholders must be considered 20. This is ultimately the reason why the 
exemption is granted and the key to understanding what situations it must 
cover. 
 
 One of the advantages of the scope of application, as defined by art. 8 
d) RDOPAS is that it is not limited to the agreements reached in insolvency 
proceedings. As mentioned above, a debt for equity swap leading to a 
change in control in a listed company can be included as part of a wider 
restructuring agreement to cure a company’s financial problems. Such 
agreements are often reached outside insolvency proceedings as a way of 
avoiding financial and reputation costs. The exemption therefore covers 
these agreements and, in particular, the refinancing agreements referred to 
in DA4 of the Spanish LC. However, mention should here be made to the 
difficulties arising from the strict concept of the agreements covered by the 
protection afforded by DA4 LC21 and the apparent extraordinary nature of 
debt for equity as content thereof22. In any case, even if the agreement does 
not fall within the scope of application of the DA4, it will be irrelevant for the 
                                             
19 Any statement in the sense indicated (serious threat to the financial situation) in 
an auditors’ report should be considered as sufficient for the requirement stated in art. 8 
d) RDOPAS to be met, see LEON, 2010, p. 208.  
20 LEON, 2010, p. 208. 
21 The problem is a consequence of the requirements of DA4 LC (a significant 
increase in the credit available for the company or the modification of the obligations by 
replacing them for new ones or the extension of deadlines), see on page 4. 
22 In this regard, see LEON, 2010, p. 207. 
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purposes of the exemption to a mandatory takeover bid, as the DA4 does not 
limit the agreements that can be validly reached, but rather those for which 
special protection against rescission for fraud is provided. Parties will tend to 
meet the conditions of the DA4, but this does not mean that there is no room 
outside it for agreements affected by the exemption stated in art. 8 d) 
RDOPAS. 
 
 The second condition is that the operation must be designed to 
ensure financial recovery in the long term. Once again, the rule uses an 
open concept linked to non-legal concepts that should be construed 
according to the intended purpose of the exemption. It should be observed, 
however, that in this case the rule adopts an intention oriented position. For 
obvious reasons, it would be impossible to require recovery because of the 
agreement, as it will be affected not only by the operation itself, but also by 
many other external factors (market growth, future management, etc.). It is 
therefore logical that the exemption must rely on the intention of the parties, 
which requires an analysis of whether or not the operation seeks such 
purpose and, in my opinion, could reasonably be achieved in the underlying 
situation and foreseeable evolution of the company and its business activity 
23. Accordingly, the special role given to the CNMV regarding the exemption 
is fully understandable, as independent control of compliance with 
requirements is necessary. If the operation is part of a refinancing agreement 
of the kind set forth in the DA 4 LC, there must be a report from an 
independent expert appointed by the Registry, playing a very relevant role in 
this regard. It is true that the DA4 LC uses a different time reference (short 
and medium term), but it would be advisable for the parties to the agreement 
for the independent report to also focus on the long term, in favour of the 
exemption. 
 
 The time reference used by art. 8 d) RDOPAS is undefined and 
resembles that referred to in the DA4 LC (short and medium term). Although 
                                             
23 Part of the legal doctrine consider necessary a viability plan analyzing the 
operation and how it will affect the long term recovery of the company, see TAPIA 
HERMIDA/ALONSO LEDESMA/RODRÍGUEZ MARTINEZ, 2009, 257 
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there are certain standards in finance, it would probably be necessary to 
adopt a case-oriented approach and consider the time used for analysis by 
the parties, thus giving them flexibility as to the duration of the “time” 
reference24. 
 
C. NON-AUTOMATIC EXEMPTION 
 
 Exemption from filing a mandatory takeover bid is not automatic and 
ultimately depends on the decision of the supervisor: the Spanish National 
Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, CNMV 
hereinafter)25. The reason for this is undoubtedly that the requirements for 
the exemption are not a standard checklist. Some of them, as already 
mentioned, are defined in such a broad way that a comprehensive and 
independent analysis of the situation is required as to the foreseeable future, 
the intention of the parties and even the design of the operation itself. 
Amongst the alternatives (a faster and more certain procedure vs. a more 
adaptive rule), the law has chosen the more flexible rule, even though it 
leads to uncertainty 26. As explained below, the situation could have been 
considered different in out of court or in voluntary agreements to insolvency 
proceedings, but this distinction has been clearly rejected, so the approach is 
exactly the same regarding the role of the CNMV in the exemption. I will 
attempt to briefly explain the possible consequences of the non-automatic 
nature of the exemption in general. 
 
 The fact that the CNMV must evaluate the requisites and decide 
whether to grant or refuse the exemption poses two different issues. The 
first is how much freedom the supervisor has in this regard. Even if a final 
decision must be made by the CNMV, it would be a mistake to consider it 
                                             
24 See a similar approach for the DA4 LC reference (short and medium terms) in 
GARCIA-CRUCES, 2009, 27. 
25 The fact that the CNMV has the power to decide and that the exemption is not 
automatic explains why a part of Spanish legal doctrine doubts whether it is a case of 
exemption or rather a dispensation (see SENENT, 2010, 364). The difference plays no role 
if a different approach to the categories of exceptions to mandatory takeover bids is used, 
see FARRANDO, 2010, 154 ff. 
26 See, similarly, ZURITA, 2009, 219. 
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arbitrary. As stated above, the exemption conditions are defined very broadly 
in order to make the rule as flexible as possible. This is the reason why the 
exemption, unlike the others in art. 8 RDOPAS, is not automatically granted 
and requires evaluation by the CNMV. The supervisor must decide whether 
the specific situation falls under the scope and aim of the exemption, in 
other words, if the operation will allow the company in distress to solve its 
financial problems, taking into account all the information provided by the 
parties, which must be evaluated by the CNMV accordingly. To avoid any 
arbitrariness, even if not specifically stated in art. 8 d) RDOPAS, the CNMV 
should explain the grounds for its decision, especially when the exemption is 
not granted. 
 
A second issue arising from art. 8 d) RDOPAS is whether a non-
automatic exemption will affect the system’s practical application. The 
answer is clearly positive: it will have a substantial impact. The parties 
engaged in this kind of agreement cannot be sure from the beginning of 
whether it will be eligible for the exemption, as it will ultimately depend on 
the evaluation made by the supervisor. Of course, they can try to meet all the 
conditions as set forth in art. 8 d) RDOPAS and obviously provide appropriate 
proof to the CNMV (for instance, by way of an independent expert’s report). 
However, they cannot be one hundred percent sure of a positive answer from 
the supervisor to their request. This uncertainty will probably act as 
deterrence to this kind of operation for listed companies in distress, when 
the effect is the gaining of control, leading creditors to other alternatives 
where they can expect certainty in relation to financial conditions. It should 
not be overlooked how much an eventual mandatory takeover bid will 
increase the costs of the operation27. Whether or not this solution will be 
different depending on the scenario under which control is gained will be 
discussed below, however it seems clear that in the balance between a priori 
certainty and flexibility of the rule, plus public control to avoid abuse, 
Spanish law has clearly decided for the latter. 
 
                                             
27 In this regard, see SENENT, 2010, p. 365. 
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CNMV intervention follows a specific procedure. It is obvious that the 
procedure commences after a request for exemption has been made by the 
parties to the agreement, namely by the entity acquiring control after the 
operation has taken place 28. The Law does not require any formalities, 
although the application must contain all the documents evidencing 
compliance with the conditions under which the exemption can be granted29. 
There is no list of the documents that must accompany the request and the 
parties are relatively free to enclose those they consider appropriate, such as 
independent expert reports on the conditions of the agreement, the 
company’s financial problems and how the agreement will allow the company 
to survive in the long term. 
 
The CNMV has 15 days to grant exemption or refuse it and, although 
application is not mandatory before completing the operation, it is obviously 
better to do so, in order to be sure of the CNMV’s position. According to the 
general principles of Administrative Law, if the CNMV does not provide an 
answer to the request in the specified time, the exemption can be taken for 
granted 30. 
 
Finally, it must be considered whether the option taken by Spanish 
Law could have been different under certain scenarios. This is a question 
arising mainly from the contrast between the solution adopted by RDOPAS 
and that of the repealed regulation. It should be said that in the previous 
RD/1997, the exemption equivalent to that set forth in art. 8 d) RDOPAS was 
automatic, as it was linked to an agreement in insolvency proceedings. In the 
now repealed art. 4 RD1197/1991, the exemption was granted for any 
control gained after a debt for equity agreement resulting from a voluntary 
agreement reached in insolvency proceedings. No further intervention by the 
CNMV was required; hence the exemption was automatic if the requirements 
were met. The different approach is clearly a consequence of the broadening 
of the scope of application of the rule. As an agreement can be reached 
                                             
28 See SANCHEZ CALERO, 2009, 196. 
29 See SENENT, 2010, p. 365. 
30 See FARRANDO, 2010, 175. 
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outside court, there is no independent control of company’s situation and 
whether or not it is truly in distress. It must not be overlooked that this is the 
starting point for exemption from filing a takeover bid. The insolvency 
procedure and court control is thus replaced by the control of the CNMV. 
 
In accordance with the above ideas, some authors consider that 
another option was available to Spanish legislators, who could have 
differentiated between out of court and insolvency agreements. For the 
former, CNMV control would be reasonable, as explained. For the second, 
however, the compromise between flexibility and certainty could have been 
decided in favour of the latter. The idea is that whenever an agreement is 
reached during insolvency proceedings, no further controls are needed. 
Firstly, because the procedure requires insolvency to be opened, which is a 
concept included in art. 8 d) RDOPAS (economical viability under a serious 
and imminent threat), which must pass court control. Secondly, the presence 
of an insolvency court guarantees protection of all the parties included and 
an analysis of the role that the agreement will play in the future survival of 
the company. The further intervention of the CNMV is not only unnecessary, 
but also creates certain coordination problems in the proceedings. It should 
be mentioned that such intervention will render almost impossible a 
voluntary agreement of this kind without previous exemption, as under 
Spanish law, a conditioned agreement is forbidden by insolvency law (see art. 
100 LC). Legal doctrine suggests that Spanish law should have set up two 
different conditions for the exemption, making evaluation by the CNMV 
necessary only for out of court agreements31. 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
Changes in corporate control often take place in the context of a financial 
crisis of a company, as an effect of the situation or its possible solutions. In 
some markets, namely financial markets, the special procedures can lead to a 
change in control of the companies affected. Furthermore, certain 
agreements designed to end with the solvency problems of a company can 
                                             
31 See ZURITA, 219, SENENT, 2010, 365 
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be a source of such changes. This agreements can be reached whether 
before any insolvency proceeding is opened or into it, once it has been 
opened. One of the clearest examples are debt for equity swaps, in which 
debt is exchanged for shares, so previous creditors are transformed into 
shareholders, or the capital shared by shareholders is increased as a result of 
the operation. In those situations involving public listed companies, it raises 
the question of whether the rules governing takeover bids must be adapted, 
as they can compromise this way of solving solvency problems of these 
companies. This is the case where a mandatory takeover bid must follow the 
change of control, as it would increase the cost of the operation making it 
unattractive. There are special rules under Spanish law exempting the 
mandatory takeover bid for any debt for equity agreement that serves as an 
instrument to ensure the survival of a company in distress and leads to a 
change of control of the company. The rule, set forth in art. 8d) RDOPAS 
requires two different conditions. 
 
First of all, the control gain must follow a debt for equity agreement. The 
control gain is not specially defined, so it derives of the holding of a voting 
rights share equal or exceeding 30% or, if less, of the appointing of a number 
of directors that, together with the directors previously appointed within the 
24 months subsequent to acquiring the share represents more than half the 
company’s board of directors. More relevant, the control must result of a 
debt for equity swap, what means that the way it is gained is irrelevant as 
long as it is a consequence of that kind of agreement. Although it will not 
cover other kind of agreements that can derive into a change in control, 
under Spanish law this is not referred only to the typical corporate law capital 
increase by way of a debt for shares exchange, but covers also any operation 
in which a debt is transformed into shares, resulting in the gaining of 
control, i.e., when the control is acquired, for instance, after foreclosure of 
share pledges or in cases of share assignment. It is not necessary that the 
control is gained only because of the agreement, but its role must not be 
insignificant to preserve the exceptional nature of the provision. There is 
some incoherence in the fact that the exemption will apply if the debt 
exchanged for equity was previously transferred, as Spanish insolvency law 
does not seem favourable to these situations. 
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 Secondly, the agreement must be a solution for companies in distress. It is 
not necessary that the company is under an insolvency proceeding, but its 
financial viability must in serious and imminent danger. Although such a 
wide concept puts problems, it guarantees the granting of exemption in any 
situation equivalent to voluntary agreements in insolvency. As the concept is 
disassociated of the conditions required for insolvency procedure to be 
opened it should not be construed under the legal doctrine and court 
interpretation of the notions used by the Spanish Insolvency Law. The wider 
scope of application of the art. 8d) RDOPAS has the advantage that it covers 
any agreement, provided the financial situation of the company endangers 
seriously its future viability. Preinsolvency workouts coud benefit, then, of 
the exemption set forth in art. 8d). As an additional requirement, the 
operation must be designed to ensure financial recovery in the long term. 
This requirement relies on the intention of the parties, but must be tested by 
the supervisor according to the information given by the parties, the 
underlying situation and the foreseeable evolution of the company and its 
business activity. The time reference should be evaluated according to the 
time used for analysis by the parties. 
 
The exemption is not automatic and depends on the decision of the Spanish 
supervisor (CNMV). This is a consequence of how broadly the requirements 
are defined, making it necessary an independent analysis of the situation. 
This decision must not be arbitrary, being therefore necessary that the CNMV 
explain the grounds, especially when it is refused. The uncertainty deriving 
of this non-automatic nature will probably act as deterrence for this kind of 
operations for listed companies, but it seems that Spanish legislators have 
opted for a more flexible rule, plus public control to avoid abuses. The 
procedure is the same even if the agreement is reached in an insolvency 
procedure, although in this situation there is some control by the insolvency 
court of the situation of the company and the content of the agreement and a 
different solution could have been considered to avoid the coordination 
problems that inevitably arises in these scenarios. 
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